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OUT OF REACH: PROTECTING PARENTAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FROM
CLAWBACK IN BANKRUPTCY
ABSTRACT
Parental contributions to higher education have become commonplace.
However, courts are divided on how contributions by parents towards the
college education of their children should be treated when those parents file
for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code grants trustees avoidance powers under
§ 548 to recover transfers made by a debtor up to two years before the petition
date if those transfers are actually or constructively fraudulent. Trustees are
attempting to use these avoidance powers to “clawback” payments made to
colleges and universities by debtors for the education of their children. Factors
including societal expectations, financial aid calculations, emotional benefits,
and economics have created varying opinions on whether these contributions
constitute constructive fraud under § 548.
This disagreement has not gone unnoticed. In 2015, a bill was introduced
in the House of Representatives that seeks to create an exception to trustee
avoidance power for all parental tuition payments: the Protecting All College
Tuition (PACT) Act. However, the PACT will not effectively protect
educational expenditures from trustee avoidance powers because it fails to
explicitly preempt state bankruptcy laws.
Parental contributions to higher education are similar to charitable
donations, a category of transfers that has been protected from trustee
avoidance powers since the passage of the Religious Liberty and Charitable
Donation Protection Act (RLCDPA) of 1998. Using the RLCDPA as a guide,
this Comment will propose amendments to the Code to protect payments to
institutions of higher education by parent debtors on behalf of their children.
With simple additions to § 544 and § 548, federal lawmakers can advance the
public’s interest in higher education, protect creditors, and limit the need for
litigation around the subject.
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INTRODUCTION
As the cost of college continues to rise, parents are contributing more
financially to the higher education of their children.1 When a parent files for
bankruptcy, these contributions become subject to review.2 In recent years,
some bankruptcy trustees have tried to recover (“clawback”) payments made to
colleges and universities by parent debtors on behalf of their adult children.3
The trustees argue that, where a child is eighteen or older, these funds should
be used to satisfy the parent debtor’s own growing debts.4 As of 2015, at least
twenty-five colleges had been asked to return money as fraudulent transfers
and over a dozen had complied.5 According to consumer bankruptcy experts,
this trend is expected to rise.6
Trustees are responsible for examining the financial history of a debtor in
bankruptcy and, where possible, recovering funds the debtor transferred prior
to filing for redistribution to creditors.7 Where a trustee finds that a debtor did
not receive “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for a transfer of the
debtor’s assets, the trustee can sue to recover that property as a constructively
fraudulent transfer.8 Most commonly, trustees look for property or cash the
debtor gave to family members or friends.9 But when a parent pays tuition to a
college or university for his or her child, some trustees have argued that it is
not the parent who receives value in return, but the child.10 It is under this
argument that trustees look to recover those funds.11
The Bankruptcy Code (the Code) does not define reasonably equivalent
value, but courts and commentators agree that debtors must receive some sort
of economic benefit in exchange for a transfer of their assets before reasonably

1
See SALLIE MAE, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR COLLEGE 7–9 (2015), http://news.salliemae.com/files/
doc_library/file/HowAmericaPaysforCollege2014FNL.pdf.; see also Katy Stech, Bill Proposes Ban on Tuition
Clawbacks in Bankruptcy, WALL STREET J.: BANKRUPTCY BEAT (May 12, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/
bankruptcy/2015/05/12/bill-proposes-ban-on-tuition-clawbacks-in-bankruptcy.
2
See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
3
Stech, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 17–18 (3d ed. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics.
8
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
9
Stech, supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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equivalent value can be found.12 Even still, some courts have effectively
ignored the requirement of reasonably equivalent value in their analysis and
instead based their decisions to protect tuition payments from clawback on
public policy grounds.13
The courts are not the only ones that think trustees should not be able to
clawback tuition from universities.14 In 2015, federal lawmakers introduced the
Protecting All College Tuition (PACT) Act to protect tuition payments from
trustees.15 The PACT Act addresses the treatment of tuition payments by
parent debtors in bankruptcy and seeks to protect such payments from
clawback under § 548 of the Code.16 However, the bill stalled after it was
introduced in the House of Representatives.17 This lack of activity coupled
with several drafting issues suggest that the PACT Act, as it is written, is not
the solution to the disagreement on how educational expenditures should be
treated in bankruptcy.18 That does not mean the goal of that legislation is
unfounded, though. Protecting tuition payments from clawback is important for
three policy reasons: (1) parental income impacts student financial aid, (2)
schools receive payments from parents in good faith, and (3) society expects
parents to help their children pay for college.
This Comment will argue that § 544 and § 548 of the Code should be
amended to protect parental payments to colleges and universities. It will
suggest protection for such payments that equate to fifteen percent or less of
the parent debtor’s income and those that exceed fifteen percent where a
consistent practice can be shown. This fifteen percent threshold is similar to
the protection the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act
(RLCDPA) created for charitable donations.19 RLCDPA, enacted in 1998, will
serve as a helpful starting point.20 But this Comment will show that effective
legislation must go a few steps further and address some of the questions left
12
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see, e.g., Gold v. Marquette Univ. (In re Leonard), 454 B.R.
444, 444 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); Lisle v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (In re Wilkinson), 196 F. App’x 337, 341
(6th Cir. 2006).
13
See, e.g., Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2010); In re
Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457–58.
14
See Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267, 114th Cong. (2015).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See id.
18
See id.; Elizabeth Stephens, PACT Will Not Prevent Trustees from Attempting to Claw Back College
Tuition Payments, 35-2 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 16, 17 (2016).
19
See generally Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105183, § 3, 112 Stat. 517 (1998).
20
Id.
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unanswered by RLCDPA.21 By amending § 544 and 548 to protect payments
to colleges and universities where specific criteria are met, Congress can
protect both the ability of parents to contribute to their children’s higher
education and the interest of creditors in preventing debtor fraud.
I.

BACKGROUND

When an individual files for chapter 7 bankruptcy, the individual seeks to
liquidate his nonexempt22 property in exchange for a discharge of his debts.23
After a debtor files a petition with the bankruptcy court, a chapter 7 trustee is
appointed to administer the debtor’s estate and facilitate the liquidation of the
debtor’s nonexempt assets.24 The trustee seeks to maximize the amount
received by the debtor’s unsecured creditors, utilizing the powers granted by
the Code.25
One of these powers is avoidance power, or the power to clawback
transfers of property made by a debtor in the two years preceding the
bankruptcy filing if the transfers are fraudulent.26 Fraudulent transfers include
both those that are actually fraudulent and those that are constructively
fraudulent.27 Deciding if a debtor received reasonably equivalent value for a
transfer is an important step in identifying constructively fraudulent transfers.28
Unfortunately, the Code does not define reasonably equivalent value, so the
job of interpreting the concept has fallen to the courts.29 This task has proven
to be particularly challenging where the value, if any, a debtor receives in
exchange for a transfer of his property is indirect or intangible.30 A scenario in
which this challenge commonly arises is when a debtor has contributed
financially to his children’s higher education in the two years preceding the

21

See generally id.
Chapter 7 debtors may keep some of their property that is exempt under federal or state bankruptcy
law. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012).
23
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 7, at 18–20.
24
Id. at 17–18.
25
See id.
26
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
27
See id.
28
See id. § 548(a)(1)(B).
29
See id.; see, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 455–57;
Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), 490 B.R. 687, 701–02 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013); DeGiacomo v. Sacred
Heart Univ. (In re Palladino), 556 B.R. 10, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016).
30
See, e.g., Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA,
Inc.), 680 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012).
22
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bankruptcy filing.31 So far, courts disagree about whether such payments
constitute constructive fraud.32 This Section will further explain § 548 and
trustee avoidance powers. Then it will seek to better understand the meaning of
reasonably equivalent value. Finally, it will introduce four key cases that
demonstrate the variety of approaches courts have taken in analyzing parental
contributions to higher education under § 548.
A. Section 548 – Fraudulent Transfers
Section 548 of the Code grants the bankruptcy trustees avoidance powers.33
In other words, § 548 grants trustees the ability to clawback transfers made
prior to bankruptcy if such transfers are found to be fraudulent.34 The section
serves to ensure a debtor’s assets are distributed in a way that is in the best
interest of all creditors.35
Provisions like this have a deep history in bankruptcy law. The history of
this section dates back to the Statute of 13 Elizabeth which was passed by the
English parliament in 1571.36 The Statute sought to address a practice by
debtors of transferring their assets to friends or family to obstruct attempts by
creditors to collect on their claims.37 Debtors waited until their creditors gave
up on recovering their claims and then retook ownership of the property they
had transferred.38 These actions by the debtor were fraudulent because they
depleted the debtor’s estate without receiving anything of similar value in
exchange that could be used to satisfy the claims of his creditors.39
Today, trustees can avoid transfers made by the debtor up to two years
before the filing date of the bankruptcy petition.40 Section 548(a)(1) provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that was made

31
See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 455–57; In re
Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 14–15.
32
Compare In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, and In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 458, with In re
Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711, and In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 14–15.
33
See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
34
See id.
35
See H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 177–78 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138–39.
36
Mellon Bank N.A. v. Metro Commc’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 643–44 (3d Cir. 1991). See generally 11
U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
37
Mellon Bank N.A., 945 F.2d at 643.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012).

MACDONALD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

248

12/21/2017 2:07 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)
(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation; . . . .41

This section allows trustees to avoid transfers if they are either actually
fraudulent or constructively fraudulent.42 Actually fraudulent transfers,
reachable by trustees under § 548(a)(1)(A), are those that are made “with
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” a creditor.43 Under § 548(a)(1)(B),
trustees can also avoid transfers that were not intended to be fraudulent if the
debtor was insolvent or became insolvent when the transfer was made and
“received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”44 These
transfers are referred to as constructively fraudulent.45
It is easy to identify constructive fraud when a transfer is made for no
consideration.46 However, it becomes less clear if a transfer constitutes
constructive fraud when a debtor receives something of value in exchange for
his property, but there is a question of whether the value received was
“reasonably equivalent.”47 Even more challenging are situations in which a
debtor received some indirect or intangible benefit in exchange for the transfer
of his property.48
B. What is Reasonably Equivalent Value?
A key consideration in analyzing potentially fraudulent transfers under
§ 548(a)(1)(B) is whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value in
41

Id.
See id.
43
Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
44
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B); see Trey Monsour, Understanding Fraudulent Transfers and Ensuing Litigation,
LAW 360 (July 2, 2014), http://law360.com/articles/553894/understanding-fraudulent-transfers-and-ensuinglitigation.
45
See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012).
46
Monsour, supra note 44.
47
Id.
48
See, e.g., In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301.
42
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the exchange.49 That the debtor receives “less than a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange” is a fundamental feature of a constructively fraudulent
transfer, but deciding whether reasonably equivalent value has been received is
probably the most difficult task in a fraudulent transfer analysis.50
In § 548(d)(2)(A), the Code says value is: “property or satisfaction or
securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but [value] does not
include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative
of the debtor.”51 The Code does not define reasonably equivalent value,
however, and courts do not agree on how the term should be interpreted.52 In
fact, bankruptcy courts have acknowledged that no bright line rule exists to
determine if reasonably equivalent value is received.53
Bankruptcy courts have said that the first step in deciding if a transferor
receives reasonably equivalent value is to decide if any value was received at
all.54 They have also long acknowledged that fair consideration may be
received in the form of an indirect benefit.55 The court in Rubin v.
Manufacturers Trust Co., first explained what has come to be known as the
indirect benefit rule:
[A] debtor may sometimes receive “fair” consideration even though
the consideration given for his property or obligation goes initially to
a third person . . . . [T]he transaction’s benefit to the debtor need not
be direct; it may come indirectly through benefit to a third person . . .
If the consideration given to the third person has ultimately landed in
the debtor’s hands, or if the giving of the consideration to the third
person otherwise confers an economic benefit upon the debtor, then
the debtor’s net worth has been preserved, and [the statute] has been
satisfied—provided, of course, that the value of the benefit received
by the debtor approximates the value of the property or obligation he
has given up.56

49

See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012).
Jeffrey Baliban, Measuring Reasonably Equivalent Value, A.B.A. (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter2012-measuring-reasonble-value.html.;
see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012).
51
11 U.S.C § 548(d)(2)(A) (2012).
52
See id.; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
53
In re Lindell, 334 B.R. 249, 256 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); see also Creditors’ Comm. Of Jumer’s
Castle Lodge, Inc. v. Jumer (In re Jumer’s Castle Lodge, Inc.), 338 B.R. 244, 354 (C.D. Ill. 2006).
54
In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 341; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
55
See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991–92 (2nd Cir. 1981).
56
Id.
50
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In other words, an indirect benefit may be recognized, but the courts must still
decide if the value of that benefit is reasonably equivalent to the value of the
property exchanged.57
The court in In re TOUSA, further clarified what is required to recognize
an indirect benefit.58 In that case, the parent company, TOUSA, Inc., was a
Florida home builder indebted to a collection of lenders, the Transeastern
Lenders, as a result of its involvement in a joint venture, the Transeastern JV.59
The joint venture went into default on its debt and litigation ensued among
TOUSA, the Transeastern JV and the Transeastern Lenders.60 TOUSA
eventually settled with the joint venture for $420 million and its subsidiaries
were made to pledge assets to secure new loans for payment of the
settlement.61 But most of these “Conveying Subsidiaries,” as they were called,
had no liability in the joint venture debt.62
TOUSA and many of its subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy within six
months of obtaining the new loans and a suit was brought to recover the
settlement funds for the conveying subsidiaries.63 The Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors, which brought the suit on behalf of the
subsidiaries, argued that they did not receive reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the funds used to pay a settlement that was an obligation to
the joint venture of TOUSA and not the subsidiaries.64 The bankruptcy
court agreed, holding that the funds paid in the settlement were a fraudulent
transfer because “the Conveying Subsidiaries did not receive reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer [and] . . . did not receive
either ‘property’ or the ‘satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent
debt of the debtor,’” among other reasons.65 Additionally, the bankruptcy
court found that the defendants did not produce evidence of tangible and
concrete indirect benefits or any value of such benefits that could be
quantified with reasonable precision.66

57

See id. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012).
See In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
59
See In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
60
In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
61
In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
62
In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
63
In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1301; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
64
In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1302; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
65
3V Cap. Master Fund Ltd. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 444 B.R.
613, 650 (S.D. Fla. 2011); see also Baliban, supra note 50.
66
In re TOUSA, Inc., 444 B.R. at 650; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
58
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The court listed three requirements that must be met for an indirect benefit
to be recognized: (1) the debtor must receive the benefit, even if indirectly; (2)
the value received must be in some kind of enforceable entitlement to tangible
or intangible property; (3) the property must be received in exchange for the
transfer or obligation.67
The courts have suggested that the Code’s reference to property in the
definition of value should be construed “in its broadest sense, including cash,
all interests in property, such as liens, and every kind of consideration
including promises to act or forbear to act.”68 The Supreme Court has advised
that “the term property . . . does not exclude interests that are novel or
contingent or where enjoyment must be postponed.”69 Value, for bankruptcy
purposes, seems to be synonymous with economic value and “economic value
connotes monetary value, even if it is not immediately recognized.”70 But the
Code does not instruct on the valuation of such economic benefits.71
As economist Jeffrey Baliban explained, “[w]hile it is certainly appropriate
that valuation experts should leave matters of law to the court, they can help
with matters of fact where quantifying value is concerned.”72 Section 548
serves to preserve value for unsecured creditors.73 With this in mind, it seems
equitable that the “valuation of property [or] benefits received in a transfer
should be analyzed from the creditors’ point of view.”74 Some courts
conducting these valuations have chosen to apply a strict mathematical formula
based on fair market value to decide if reasonably equivalent value has been
received.75 Fair market value is “the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts.”76 To qualify as reasonably equivalent value under the formula,

67

In re TOUSA, Inc., 444 B.R. at 641; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
In re TOUSA, Inc., 444 B.R. at 656; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
69
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966); see also Baliban, supra note 50.
70
Baliban, supra note 50.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Cooper v. Ashley Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 1990);
see also Durrett v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203–04 (5th Cir. 1980); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Co., 21 B.R. 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging, but refusing to follow Durrett’s mathematical
formula); see also Baliban, supra note 50 (quoting In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc., 914 F.2d at 466).
76
United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 559 (1973); see also Baliban, supra note 50.
68
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consideration must be worth at least seventy percent of the fair market value.77
Other courts have rejected “any fixed mathematical formula . . . and opt[ed] for
the standard that ‘[r]easonable equivalence should depend on all the facts of
each case,’ an important element of which is market value.”78 Under this
standard, fair market value remains an important consideration, but case-bycase adjudication is required.79
The effect of an indirect benefit on a transferor’s cost of capital may also
be relevant.80 Cost of capital is the “expected rate of return that the market
participants require in order to attract funds to a particular investment.”81 Any
transfers a debtor makes that improve “its ability to generate cash flow, make
its cash flows more consistent, or avoid the loss of cash flow could be viewed
to have favorable impact on its cost of capital.”82
The court in Lisle v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (In re Wilkinson), shared
Baliban’s view that a benefit, whether directly or indirectly received by a
debtor, must be an “economic” one to be considered “value.”83 According to
the Wilkinson court, “[t]he district court rightly stated that ‘the focus should be
on the overall effect on the debtor’s net worth after the transfer.’”84 Other
courts have expressed a similar idea in holding that “ethereal” or “emotional
benefits” do not constitute value for purposes of § 548.85 The Wilkinson court
held that, where an indirect benefit is alleged to be received, a debtor must
demonstrate that the benefit is “concrete and quantifiable.”86
The debtor also has the burden of actually quantifying the benefit.87 The
court acknowledged that this burden “can be challenging in a case where the
alleged benefit is goodwill, corporate synergy, a business opportunity, the
continuation of a business relationship, or some other intangible benefit.”88 In

77
In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc., 914 F.2d at 466; see Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203; Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426–
27; see also Baliban, supra note 50.
78
In re Morris Commc’ns, Inc., 914 F.2d at 466–67 (quoting Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
79
Baliban, supra note 50.
80
Id.
81
Id. (citing SHANNON PRATT & ROGER GRABOWSKI, COST OF CAPITAL: APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES
(4th ed. 2010)).
82
Baliban, supra note 50.
83
In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342.
84
Id.
85
E.g., Pereira v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Gonzalez), 342 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
86
In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342.
87
Id.
88
Id.
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Wilkinson, the indirect benefit to the debtor resulted in a reduction to his
debt.89 The court found this to be a “concrete and quantifiable” indirect
benefit.90 Thus, in order to be considered value, and potentially reasonably
equivalent value, an indirect benefit must be: “(1) an ‘economic’ benefit; (2)
concrete; and (3) quantifiable.”91
C. Court Application of Reasonably Equivalent Value Standard to
Educational Expenditures
When analyzing educational expenditures under § 548, the decision
whether such payments constitute constructive fraud should turn on if the
parent making the payment received reasonably equivalent value in exchange.
Courts have been split on whether such payments should be protected from
clawback by the trustee in bankruptcy.92 Many courts, especially those holding
that these payments should be protected, have not focused their analyses
strictly on determining if reasonably equivalent value was received.93 Rather,
these courts have engaged in judicial activism and based their holdings on
policy considerations, effectively creating an exception not provided for in the
Code.94
Four cases since 2010 illustrate the disagreement among bankruptcy judges
on whether educational expenditures made on behalf of a debtor’s child in the
two years preceding bankruptcy should be protected from the bankruptcy
trustee.95 On one hand, the bankruptcy courts in Banner v. Lindsay (In re
Lindsay) and Gold v. Marquette (In re Leonard) concluded that such payments
are constructively fraudulent and reachable by the trustee.96 On the other hand,
the courts in Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick) and DeGiacomo v. Sacred
Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino) found that the benefits parents receive are
enough to warrant protection for these payments.97 As these cases will show,

89

Id.
Id.
91
Id.
92
See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490
B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10.
93
See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490
B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
94
See, e.g., In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15–16. See generally 11
U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
95
See In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490 B.R.
687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10.
96
In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444.
97
In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10.
90
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the courts are starkly divided on the proper treatment of these payments in
bankruptcy.98
1. Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay): Transfers Are Fraudulent When Fair
Consideration Is Not Received
In Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay), the court held that transfers by the
debtor were constructively fraudulent because fair consideration was not
received.99 In this case, the chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid transfers made by
the debtor to his wife, his son, and a college where his son was enrolled.100 The
debtor had previously been sued by a co-owner of his business and two years
later, after violating an injunction resulting from that lawsuit, was ordered to
pay over a million dollars in damages to the co-owner.101 The debtor
transferred personal assets, including stock, cash, and the title to a house to his
wife.102 The debtor also sold personal property, including a car and a
motorcycle, and used the proceeds to pay his son’s college tuition.103 Just a few
months later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy.104
The court emphasized that an important factor in determining a
constructively fraudulent transfer is whether the conveyance was made with
fair consideration.105 The court asserted that fair consideration requires three
things: “1. the recipient either conveyed property in exchange or discharged an
antecedent debt in exchange; 2. such exchange is the ‘fair equivalent of the
property received;’ and 3. such exchange was made in good faith.”106 When
deciding this issue, the court stated that “[t]he burden of proof shifts from the
plaintiff to the defendant where the facts regarding the nature of the
consideration are in the defendant’s control.”107
According to the court, the debtor failed to satisfy his burden of proof and
demonstrate fair consideration.108 The court concluded that the debtor had no
98
See In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490 B.R.
687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10.
99
In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *1–2.
100
Id. at *1–8.
101
Id. at *11.
102
Id. at *12.
103
Id. at *13.
104
Id.
105
Id. at *14–15; see Ackerman v. Ventimiglia (In re Ventimiglia), 362 B.R. 71, 81–82 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2007).
106
In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *16–17; see In re Ventimiglia, 362 B.R. at 81–84.
107
In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *19.
108
Id. at *1–2.
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legal obligation to pay for his child’s college education.109 It also rejected the
argument that the debtor has a “moral obligation” to fund his son’s college
education.110 The court also relied on a recent ruling in which another
bankruptcy court dismissed a chapter 7 case for substantial abuse when the
debtor admitted he filed the case with the goal of better positioning himself to
fund a college education for his children.111 The Lindsay court held that the
$35,055 in proceeds transferred to the university as tuition for the debtor’s son
constituted fraudulent transfers and ordered the debtor to turn this amount over
to the trustee.112
2. Gold v. Marquette (In re Leonard): Indirect Benefits Can Constitute
Reasonably Equivalent Value Only Where Economic, Concrete, and
Quantifiable
The court in Gold v. Marquette (In re Leonard) acknowledged that indirect
benefits can constitute reasonably equivalent value, but they must be
economic, concrete, and quantifiable.113 Under this standard, the court
concluded that tuition payments for a debtor’s child are avoidable in
bankruptcy.114 The debtors in this case co-signed a $35,000 student loan with
their eighteen year old son and deposited the funds into their bank account.115
In the year preceding their bankruptcy filing, the debtors wrote a check to
Marquette University totaling over $20,000 for their son’s undergraduate
education.116 When the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the trustee sought to
clawback these payments as both actually and constructively fraudulent under
the Code and Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statutes.117
The university argued that the proceeds of the student loan were held in
trust by the debtors for their son.118 Pre-petition transfers of property held in
trust for another are generally not avoidable as fraudulent transfers.119 The
court rejected this contention, however, saying that the debtors “owned a one-

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

2002).

Id. at *27.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Godios, 333 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005)).
Id. at *28.
In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 450–51; see Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838, 849–52 (6th Cir.
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half interest in the funds” and that the funds had been “commingled with the
debtor’s other funds.”120 The court supported this conclusion with “evidence
that the debtors used the funds for their own purposes, including payment of
property taxes on their home.”121
The university also argued that the debtors received reasonably equivalent
value for the payments “because the transfers enabled their son to attend and
receive a college education at [the university].”122 The trustee, however,
countered that any value received in exchange for the tuition payments made
by the debtors was received by the debtors’ son, a third party.123 The university
did not dispute a direct benefit to the debtors’ son, but claimed the debtors also
received reasonably equivalent value:
in the form of intangible benefits: (1) “their son received an
education” which “bestowed peace of mind” on the Debtors that
[their son] “will be afforded opportunities” in life that would not
have come but for the education; and (2) Debtors “anticipated that
they will not remain financially responsible” for [their son].124

Looking to previous Sixth Circuit cases, the court cited the indirect benefit
rule from Rubin and acknowledged that “[v]alue can be in the form of either a
direct economic benefit or an indirect economic benefit.”125 The court applied
the Wilkinson test that requires an indirect benefit be (1) an economic benefit,
(2) concrete, and (3) quantifiable, before it can constitute reasonably
equivalent value.126

Though it conceded that a feeling of moral obligation is “understandable,”
the court said that satisfying a moral obligation and receiving “peace of mind”
that their son “will be afforded opportunities” is not an economic benefit to the
debtors.127 The court found that speculative future relief from a need to
financially support their son was unconvincing.128 Further, the court
highlighted that the debtors had no legal obligation under Michigan law to
support their adult son.129 The court also pointed out that it was solely
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 452–53.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 455.
Id. (citing Rubin, 661 F.2d at 991–92).
Id. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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speculation that providing for an education would make a difference regarding
whether the debtors would need to provide financial support to their son in the
future.130 Under the Wilkinson framework, the court held that the debtors did
not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the payments made to
the university.131
3. Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick): Reasonably Equivalent Value and
a Familial Obligation to Provide for Education
Some courts, on the other hand, have opted to protect tuition payments
from clawback. In Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), the court recognized a
familial obligation to pay for higher education and based its decision on this
obligation rather than an analysis of reasonably equivalent value.132 In this
case, the chapter 7 trustee brought an action against the husband and wife
debtors for both actual and constructive fraudulent transfers.133 The husband
debtor was a former partner at a law firm.134 The law firm was sued by the
landlord from which it rented office space for breaching the lease
agreement.135 Approximately twenty partners, including the debtor, were also
named as defendants.136 Six years later, a judgment was entered in favor of the
landlord against the debtor, and certain other defendants, in the amount of $2.7
million.137 The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment.138 The
landlord then filed a fraudulent transfer action against the couple in an attempt
to collect on the judgment.139 Less than a year later, the couple filed for
bankruptcy.140
When the couple filed for bankruptcy, the trustee filed an adversary
proceeding against them to avoid a variety of transfers made by the couple
after the lease violation suit began, including $82,536.22 worth of payments
made to the University of Chicago and Robert Morris University for the
college education of two of their children.141 The trustee argued that the
debtors have no legal obligation under Pennsylvania law to pay for the
education of their children once they have reached eighteen years of age or
graduated from high school, whichever comes later.142 The trustee asserted
“that ‘enhanced’ education is not a necessity” and that expenditures for nonnecessities were recoverable.143
In response, the debtors argued that the tuition payments were necessary
for two reasons.144 First, the debtors argued that “college tuition and related

130
131

Id.
Id. at 460.
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educational expenses for the children [is] a family obligation.”145 Second, the
debtors explained that their children were denied student aid by both state and
federal governments because of their ‘expected family contribution.’146
The court held that the college tuition expenses were “reasonable and
necessary for the maintenance of the Debtor’s family,” but restricted this
finding to § 548 by indicating the decision was “for purposes of the fraudulent
transfer statute only.”147 The court said:
Even though there may not strictly speaking be a legal obligation for
parents to assist in financing their children’s undergraduate college
education . . . this Court has little hesitation in recognizing that there
is something of a societal expectation that parents will assist with
such expense if they are able to do so.148

The court also explained that there was no evidence the debtors had made the
educational expenditures “as part of a strategy or with an ulterior motive to
shield the funds from the reach of [the landlord].”149
4. DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino): Financially
Independent Children as Reasonably Equivalent Value
Finally, in DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), the
court held that the debtors did receive reasonably equivalent value, in the form
of a financially independent child, for the college tuition they paid.150 The
debtors were convicted on felony charges for operating a Ponzi scheme and

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id.; see In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27.
In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 711–12.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 16.
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filed joint petitions for relief under chapter 7.151 In the two years preceding
their conviction and subsequent bankruptcy filing, the debtors paid a total of
$64,696.22 to Sacred Heart University to cover tuition and other educational
expenses for their daughter.152
The chapter 7 trustee acknowledged that the university had no knowledge
of the debtors’ fraudulent activity and received their payments in good faith.
However, he argued that these transfers were constructively fraudulent because
the debtors did not “receive reasonably equivalent value from [the university]
in exchange for the payments and [they] were insolvent at the time the
payments were made.”153
The court highlighted that this case turned on a question of value. It
acknowledged “[t]here is no dispute that but for the question of value, the
debtors’ payments would qualify as constructively fraudulent.”154 The transfers
met the other requirements under § 548: “[t]he funds transferred belonged to
the [debtors], the transfers were made within the two and four year statutory
lookback periods under the Bankruptcy Code and the UFTA, and the [debtors]
were insolvent when the transfers were made.”155 The court also accepted a
previous bankruptcy court’s finding that “[e]thereal or emotional rewards, such
as love and affection, do not qualify as value for purposes of defeating a
constructive fraudulent conveyance claim”156 and that under Massachusetts
law, there is no legal obligation for a parent to support an adult child.157
Still, the court determined the trustee’s valuation of the debtors’ payments
to the university was “overly rigid.”158 It found “that the [debtors] paid [the
university] because they believed that a financially self-sufficient daughter
offered them an economic benefit and that a college degree would directly
contribute to financial self-sufficiency.”159 Based on this, the court held that
the debtors had received reasonably equivalent value from the university and
therefore, the payments did not constitute constructive fraud.160
Despite being the more recent of these four decisions, the Oberdick and
Palladino courts did not settle the issue. Courts since Palladino have reached
the same conclusion as the Lindsay and Leonard courts: that parental
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Gonzalez, 342 B.R. at 169).
Id.
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contributions to higher education are not protected from clawback in
bankruptcy.161 Legislative action could put an end to the unpredictable results
from the courts.
II. ANALYSIS
This Section will first argue that parents paying for their children’s college
education do not receive reasonably equivalent value as defined above. It will
then assess several policy arguments in favor of an exception for payments to
institutions of higher education from a trustee’s avoidance powers despite the
lack of reasonably equivalent value received in return. Next, the Protecting All
College Tuition Act of 2015, an act proposed to protect such payments from
clawback by trustees, will be introduced. Discussion of the Act will focus on
how it is incomplete and will not prevent trustees from attempting to clawback
tuition payments because it fails to pre-empt state fraudulent transfer laws.
Therefore, this Section will argue that the PACT Act is not a viable solution to
the uncertainty surrounding this issue. Finally, this Section will argue in favor
of protecting these tuition payments where certain criteria are met through
amendments to the Code similar to those made by the Religious Liberty and
Charitable Donation Act. Specifically, this Section will argue that trustees
should not be permitted to avoid payments to institutions of higher education
for the education of a debtor’s child when either: (1) the payments constitute
fifteen percent or less of the debtor’s income, or (2) the debtor can demonstrate
a pattern of making such payments or a history of saving for their children’s
education.
A. Parents Do Not Receive Reasonably Equivalent Value in Exchange for
Tuition Payments
Despite the conflicting holdings of bankruptcy courts, applying the concept
of reasonably equivalent value to tuition payments made by a parent debtor
yields a clear result. Parents do not receive reasonably equivalent value when
funding higher education for their children. The economic value derived from
a college education is received directly by the student and any indirect benefit
to a parent debtor is neither concrete nor quantifiable.162

158
159
160
161
162

Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
See, e.g., Roach v. Skidmore Coll. (In re Dunston), 566 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2017).
See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342).
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Parents often hope to provide more opportunities for their children than
they had. This is especially true in terms of education. As of 2010, fifty percent
of America’s current college students had parents who did not attend
college.163 First-generation college students comprise thirty percent of all
entering college freshmen.164 So it is not surprising that parents often feel, and
courts have recognized, a moral obligation to help their children pay for higher
education.165 For example, in In re Palladino, the mother debtor expressed this
feeling of responsibility in her affidavit:
As Nicole’s mother, I feel obligated to pay Nicole’s tuition because I
am her mother and she shouldn’t have to come out of [Sacred Heart
University] saddled with thousands of dollars in loans. Assisting
Nicole with her loans gives her the best chance of graduating from
[Sacred Heart University]. Upon graduating, Nicole will be in the
best position to go to graduate school, secure a job and become
financially self-sufficient by finding her own place to live, paying her
own bills and paying for her own food.166

There is also often a societal expectation that parents who are financially
able will assist with educational expenses.167 In the United States, high-income
parents are significantly more likely to contribute their income and savings to
their children’s college education compared to low- and middle-income
parents.168 Approximately eighty-two percent of high-income parents helped
their children pay for school with out-of-pocket funds in 2014.169 In the same
year, only roughly fifty-nine percent of middle-income and forty-three percent
of low-income parents contributed out-of-pocket funds to help pay for
school.170
In past cases, debtors have argued that they receive personal benefits as a
result of their contributions to their children’s education.171 Some of these
personal benefits include peace of mind in the future opportunities that will be
afforded to their children and love and appreciation from their children.172
Parents may also feel they gain an outward appearance of being a “good”
parent. However, while these rewards may be very important to the debtors,
they are not economic benefits and do not hold any value in the eyes of
creditors.173 Bankruptcy courts have said that abstract, emotional benefits like
love cannot constitute reasonably equivalent value when rebutting a

163
Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
164
Id.
165
See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457; see also In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27.
166
In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15.
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constructive fraud claim.174 Further, such consideration is not “concrete” or
“quantifiable” as is required under the Wilkinson test for a benefit to qualify as
value in the context of § 548.175
In addition to these intangible benefits, some debtors have claimed they
benefit economically from having financially independent children.176 In her
affidavit, the mother debtor in In re Palladino, claimed such value:
If Nicole is unable to graduate from [Sacred Heart University], she
will either move back home with me, or she will obtain her own
place to live in which case I will have to pay for her housing, bills
and food costs. Either of these options result [sic] in a financial
burden on me. The value to my husband and I [sic] in exchange for
paying the tuition to [Sacred Heart University] is a financially selfsufficient daughter resulting in an economic break to us.177

It is generally accepted, as the mother debtor argues, that a college degree
can be helpful to young adults in achieving employment and, in turn, financial
independence.178 The court in In re Palladino held that, despite the uncertainty
involved in paying a bill with the expectation of future benefits, “future
outcome cannot be the standard for determining whether one receives
reasonably equivalent value at the time of a payment.”
The court offered medical procedures and music lessons as examples of
investments that a parent might make not knowing at the time of payment if
the expenditure will ultimately be “worth it.”179 The court found that it was
reasonable to assume that a college education will “enhance the financial wellbeing of the child” which will result in an economic benefit to the parents.180
The economic benefit, in this case, is a financially independent child.181
167

See In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; see also In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15.
SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 6–7.
169
Id. at 11.
170
Id.
171
See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444; In re Oberdick, 490
B.R. 687; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10.
172
See, e.g., In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 458.
173
See id.
174
In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15 (citing In re Gonzalez, 342 B.R. at 169).
175
See In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x at 342).
176
See, e.g., In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 16.
177
Id. at 15–16.
178
See, e.g., id. at 16.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
See, e.g., id.
168
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This would be a sound conclusion if the parents had a legal obligation from
which they could be relieved. But parents neither have a legal obligation to
fund a college education for their children, nor to provide financially for their
adult children if they do not gain financial independence.182 The lack of
obligation is clear because when a bankruptcy case arises, the debtor’s adult
child will not have a valid claim for his living expenses alongside other
creditors.183 Additionally, if the child is a college student, the university will
have no claim either.184 As long as a student is eighteen or older, the college or
university they attend has no legal claim for unpaid tuition against their
parents, even if the parents have made payments on the student’s behalf in the
past.185 Paying a child’s college tuition does not satisfy any legal claim against
or obligation of a parent.186 Parents do not receive reasonably equivalent value
in return when they contribute financially to the higher education of their
children because they do not receive any direct benefits and any indirect
benefits they receive are not economic, concrete, nor quantifiable.
B. Policy Arguments for Protecting Tuition Payments
Although debtors do not receive adequate consideration for the
expenditures they make for their children’s education under the reasonably
equivalent value standard, there are several compelling policy arguments for
protecting tuition payments from a trustee’s avoidance powers, at least in part.
First, the government requires students to submit their parent’s financial
information for consideration when determining the student’s financial need.187
The financial circumstances of a student’s parents, specifically the amount the
government believes they can afford to contribute to their child’s education,
directly impact the amount of financial aid a student receives.188 Second, when
the colleges and universities accept payments from parents for the education of
their children, the schools receive these payments in good faith. These
institutions are not privy to any financial hardships parents may be facing and
have limited options for recourse if these funds are revoked by a bankruptcy

182

See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457.
See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457.
184
See, e.g., How Do I Pay? How Students Pay for Stanford, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, https://parents.
stanford.edu/how-do-i-pay/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“While the university acknowledges parents’ and
guardians’ financial support, payment is the responsibility of the student.”).
185
See, e.g., id.
186
See, e.g., In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *27; In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 458.
187
How is Aid Calculated?, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/fafsa/next-steps/howcalculated#efc (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
188
Id.
183
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trustee. Finally, as higher education becomes more of a necessity, there is a
societal expectation that parents will help their children pay for college.189
1. Expected Family Contribution: Parental Finances Impact Financial Aid
It seems counterintuitive to limit a student’s financial aid award because it
is decided his parents can afford to contribute a certain amount to his education
and then later call these transfers fraudulent if the parents file for bankruptcy.
In the 2011–2012 academic year, seventy-one percent of undergraduate
students received some form of financial aid.190 Although financial aid is often
awarded to college students based on academic merit as well as financial need,
need-based aid is the primary source of financial aid for the majority of
undergraduate students.191 Need-based aid is awarded based on a student’s
financial need, a number calculated by subtracting the student’s Expected
Family Contribution (EFC) from a school’s cost of attendance.192 EFC is
calculated based on information reported on a student’s Free Application for
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), including the taxed and untaxed income, assets,
and benefits of the student’s family.193 Other factors considered are the size of
the student’s family and the number of family members that will be enrolled in
college that year.194 For dependent students, their parents must supply this
information, and for financial aid purposes, a student can remain dependent
beyond the age of eighteen.195 The effect of parental finances on a student’s
financial aid has been raised to bankruptcy courts in previous cases.196
In In re Palladino, the debtors’ daughter, though considered an adult under
Massachusetts law, was still a dependent for college financial aid purposes.197
The debtors were required to provide personal financial information on
financial aid forms for consideration in determining their daughter’s eligibility
for aid.198 Ultimately, because she was considered a dependent, the amount of
aid their daughter received from the university was directly affected by the
189

See In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15.
Mary Beth Marklein, Students Get Financial Aid at Highest Rates Since WWII, USA TODAY (Aug.
20, 2013), http://usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/20/student-aid—amounts-increasing/2677237.
191
Need-Based Aid vs. Merit-Based Aid, THE PRINCETON REVIEW, http://princetonreview.com/collegeadvice/need-based-merit-based (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
192
How is Aid Calculated?, supra note 187.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
The EFC Formula, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/2016-17efc-formula.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
196
See, e.g., In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 12; In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711–12.
197
In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 12.
198
Id.
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financial contributions her parents were deemed to be able to make.199 This is
true for all dependent students.200
In a similar fashion, other debtors have argued that the tuition payments
they made for their children were necessary expenditures. The debtors in In re
Oberdick explained that their children were granted minimal financial aid, only
small unsubsidized loans, because of their EFC.201 In short, colleges and
universities assume parents will pay the EFC amount when awarding aid, so
that government-decided number could leave dependent students unable to pay
for college unless their parents actually contribute that amount.202
2. Schools Receive Payments in Good Faith
The concept of an Expected Family Contribution tells us that schools can
reasonably anticipate receiving payments from a student’s parents.203 Colleges
and universities accept payments from parents in good faith. Even the trustee
attempting to recover the tuition payments in In re Palladino, acknowledged
that the university received payments from the debtors on behalf of their
daughter in good faith and with no knowledge of potentially fraudulent
activity.204 Financial support from parents is so common that many colleges
and universities allow students to grant their parents electronic access to their
account to easily make payments online.205 Schools do not hold on to excess
funds; instead they receive payments to cover only the amount uncovered by
other forms of financial aid and refund any overpayments annually.206
Considering this, schools would have no reason to suspect that a student
account was being used to place debtor funds out of the reach of a bankruptcy
proceeding.
Further, payment of tuition and other fees owed to the school are ultimately
the student’s responsibility as long as the student is eighteen or older.207 This
means schools have no legal claim against the parents of a student if tuition is

199

See id.; see also The EFC Formula, supra note 195.
The EFC Formula, supra note 195; see In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 12.
201
In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 711–12.
202
See generally How is Aid Calculated?, supra note 187.
203
But see The EFC Formula, supra note 195.
204
In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 13.
205
E.g., How Do I Pay?, supra note 184.
206
See, e.g., Refunds, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, https://sfs.stanford.edu/student-accounts/refunds (last
visited Jan. 21, 2017).
207
See, e.g., How Do I Pay?, supra note 184 (“While the university acknowledges parent’s financial
support, payment is the responsibility of the student.”).
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unpaid or clawed back in bankruptcy.208 This is problematic if a student has
graduated or otherwise left the school.209 Recent college graduates are often
judgement proof and a school’s only course of action, short of litigation, is to
withhold a student’s transcripts in hopes the inconvenience encourages
graduates to pay the outstanding balance, assuming they can even afford to.210
3. College has Become a Necessity and Parents are Expected to Pay
Schools have come to expect financial contributions from parents and so
has society. As higher education becomes more of a necessity, there is a
societal expectation that parents will help their children pay for college. While
satisfaction of such a societal obligation does not result in an economic value
to a debtor, and therefore cannot constitute reasonably equivalent value, it is
still an important consideration in deciding how tuition payments should be
treated in bankruptcy.
Americans place great value on a college education.211 Between 2009 and
2014, an average of ninety-seven percent of those surveyed by Sallie Mae
agreed that college is an investment in the future.212 More than eighty percent
said they believe a college education is more important now than it used to
be.213 And on average from 2009–2014, over eighty percent still viewed going
to college as part of the American dream.214
Not only do families think college is important, they think parents should
help pay.215 Eighty-six percent of those surveyed expressed a willingness to
stretch themselves financially to facilitate their children’s higher education.216
As the court said in In re Oberdick, “there is something of a societal
expectation that parents will assist with [educational] expense[s] if they are
able to do so.”217
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See SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 6; see, e.g., How Do I Pay?, supra note 184.
See, e.g., How Do I Pay?, supra note 184.
210
See Enrollment Holds, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, https://gap.stanford.edu/handbooks/gap-handbook/
chapter-5/subchapter-5/page-5-5-1 (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
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SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 14–15.
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Id. at 14.
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Id. at 15.
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In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712.
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C. Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015: Legislation Aimed at
Protecting Tuition Payments
In 2015, probably influenced by these policy considerations, federal law
makers introduced the PACT Act in the House of Representatives.218 The bill
proposes an amendment to the Code “to provide an exception to the avoidance
of transactions by bankruptcy trustees under § 548.”219 Specifically, it seeks to
make good-faith payments by parents of postsecondary education tuition for
their children an exception to the transfers that may be avoided under § 548.220
The bill is short and straightforward.221 If passed, it would amend § 548 by
adding a new subsection.222 This addition would provide an exception to
§ 548(a)(1)(B), the subsection that lays out the requirement of reasonably
equivalent value and other criteria for finding a transfer constructively
fraudulent.223 Specifically, the amendment would read: “(f) A payment by a
parent to an institution of higher education (as defined in either § 101 or 102 of
the Higher Education Act) for the education of that parent’s child is not a
transfer covered under paragraph (1)(b).”224 In other words, under the PACT
Act, parental payments to institutions of higher education cannot be found to
be constructively fraudulent.225
The sponsor of the PACT Act, Representative Chris Collins of New York,
believes that how parents prioritize their bills is a personal choice and this
might mean paying for a child’s tuition over other debts.226 He argues that
“[f]amilies all over America . . . are tightening their belts and paying the tuition
because it is the future for their kids.”227 The bill is co-sponsored by
Representative Blake Farenthold of Texas, Representative Doug Collins of
Georgia, and Representative Luke Messer of Indiana.228 It was introduced to
the House of Representatives on May 12, 2015, and referred to the
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law on June
1, 2015.229 The bill has since stalled.230
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
Id.
Id.; 11 U.S.C § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012).
Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
See id.
Stech, supra note 1.
Id.
Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
Id.
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It is unclear why there has been a lack of movement on the bill. However,
it is unlikely it would successfully prevent trustees from avoiding tuition
payments.231 The simple language of the bill does not address the avoidance
powers available to trustees under state law.232 Its deficiencies become
apparent when compared to a similar act, the Religious Liberty and Charitable
Donations Protection Act (RLCDPA) of 1998.
1. The Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act
In 1998, Congress passed the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation
Protection Act (RLCDPA).233 Prior to the Act’s passage, courts allowed
bankruptcy trustees to clawback donations to religious institutions and other
charitable organizations made before the donor filed for bankruptcy under
§ 548(a)(1)(B).234 The RLCDPA added an exception to § 548 for charitable
donations.235 Specifically, the RLCDPA added subsection (a)(2) to the
Code.236 This subsection reads as follows:
(2) A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious or
charitable entity or organization shall not be considered to be a
transfer covered under paragraph (1)(B) in any case which—
(A) the amount of the contribution does not exceed 15 percent of
the gross annual income of the debtor for the year in which the
transfer of the contribution is made; or
(B) the contribution made by a debtor exceeded the percentage
amount of gross annual income specified in subparagraph (A), if
the transfer was consistent with the practices of the debtor in
making charitable contributions.237

The addition protects these transfers from a trustee’s clawback power
regardless of whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value in
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Id.
See Stephens, supra note 18, at 62; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
232
Stephens, supra note 18, at 17; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
233
Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548.
234
See, e.g., Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 203 B.R. 468, 478 (D. Kan. 1996);
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886, 897 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992), aff’d,
152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993), rev’d, 82 F. 3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 141 F. 3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
235
Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548.
236
Id.
237
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2012); see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548.
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exchange, but it does not work alone.238 The RLCDPA also amended § 544,
the state strong-arm provision.239
2. State Strong Arm Powers: What the PACT Act Missed
Section 544(b) of the Code allows trustees to look to state fraudulent
transfer laws for authority to avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers.240 Most states
have their own fraudulent transfer statutes. For example, in In re Leonard the
trustee sought to avoid tuition payments under both Code § 548 and
Michigan’s fraudulent transfer statute, which is virtually identical.241 Because
“section 548 merely provides an alternative to a state law cause of action,”
amending § 544 is essential to effectively limiting a trustee’s clawback
power.242
The RLCDPA adds an exception to § 544(b) to exclude transfers to
charitable organizations from any avoidance power available to trustees under
state law.243 The section now reads:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation
incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a
creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section
502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of
this title.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a transfer of a charitable
contribution (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(3)) that is not
covered under section 548(a)(1)(B), by reason of section 548(a)(2).
Any claim by any person to recover a transferred contribution
described in the preceding sentence under Federal or State law in a
Federal or State court shall be preempted by the commencement of
the case.244

238
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2012); see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548.
239
Stephens, supra note 18, at 17; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548.
240
Monsour, supra note 44.
241
In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 459; 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012); Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.34(a)(1)
(2016).
242
Stephens, supra note 18.
243
Id. at 16; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-183, § 3.
244
11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2012).
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The proposed PACT legislation, as described above, would only amend
§ 548.245 The PACT Act does not include any amendment to § 544.246 Thus,
trustees could still attempt to clawback tuition payments under individual state
law.247 Because of this, the PACT Act would not be an effective solution to
settling the disagreement on treatment of tuition payments in bankruptcy.
D. An Exception to Section 548 for Tuition Payments
The drafters of the PACT Act recognized that judicial interpretation has yet
to yield a consensus on whether payments by parents to colleges and
universities on behalf of their children should be reachable by trustees under
§ 548 of the Code.248 Under accepted interpretations of reasonably equivalent
value, payments made by a debtor to fund higher education for the debtor’s
child could be found to be constructively fraudulent.249 But policy arguments
offer significant support for protecting such payments from clawback by
trustees. Legislative action is necessary to settle the uncertainty.
This is not the first time § 548 and policy considerations have been in
conflict. RLCDPA addressed a similar situation involving charitable donations
for which debtors likely do not receive reasonably equivalent value, but that
public policy supports protecting.250 Congress should act again to resolve the
legal divide over educational expenditures in bankruptcy. An exception for
educational expenditures similar to the one created by RLCDPA for charitable
donations would embrace the policy considerations discussed above while still
adequately protecting creditors from attempts by debtors to defraud them.
1. Comparing Educational Expenditures to Charitable Contributions
Contributions to a child’s secondary education have similarities to
charitable donations. Millions of Americans make financial contributions to
religious and charitable organizations each year.251 Americans gave over $350
billion to charitable organizations in 2014.252 Similarly, millions of Americans

245

Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
Stephens, supra note 18, at 16; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
247
Stephens, supra note 18, at 16; see also Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 548; Protecting All College Tuition Act of 2015, H.R. 2267.
248
Compare In re Lindsay, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1554, and In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444, with Shearer v.
In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. 687, and In re Palladino, 556 B.R. 10.
249
See Baliban, supra note 50. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012).
250
See Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3. See
generally 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
246
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contribute to the higher education of their children each year.253 In 2014, over
20 million students attended American colleges and universities.254 In the same
year, fifty-nine percent of American students funding higher education used
some amount of parent income and savings to pay for college.255 In other
words, in 2014, over 10 million students relied on parental contributions, at
least in part, to help pay for college.256 In fact, thirty percent of all college
costs were covered by parent income and savings.257 These financial
contributions to charitable organizations and higher education both receive
favorable social and legal treatment.258
Within many religions, giving financially to one’s religious institution is an
important part of long-standing tradition. For example, speaking to Congress
on behalf of RLCDPA, Representative Ron Packard explained that for many
Christians tithing is “a sacred commandment, and they cannot practice their
religions unless they can obey this commandment that says they need to bring
their tithes to [God].”259 Similarly, and probably a reflection of the increasing
value placed on higher education, courts in more recent cases addressing the
treatment of tuition payments in bankruptcy have acknowledged a societal
expectation that parents contribute financially to the higher education of their
children.260 The courts recognizing this expectation are the same courts that
have ruled in favor of protecting such tuition payments from a trustee’s
clawback power.261 Many Christians believe donating to their church coincides
with being a good Christian and many parents believe contributing to their
children’s education coincides with being a good parent.

251
Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropicresources/charitable-giving-statistics (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
252
Id.
253
SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 6; Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, supra note 163.
254
Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, supra note 163.
255
SALLIE MAE, supra note 1, at 20.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 6.
258
See, e.g., Charitable Contribution Deductions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/charitable-contribution-deductions (last visited Nov. 7, 2016);
Tax Benefits for Education: Information Center, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/taxbenefits-for-education-information-center (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); 529 Plans: Questions and Answers,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/529-plans-questions-and-answers (last visited Nov. 7,
2016).
259
144 CONG. REC. 3999, 4001 (1998) (statement of Rep. Packard).
260
See, e.g., In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 15; see also SALLIE MAE,
supra note 1.
261
See In re Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 712; In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 16.
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The government has also demonstrated support for both charitable
donations and contributions to education through preferential tax treatment.
Charitable donations have been receiving advantageous tax treatment since
long before RLCDPA was enacted. The charitable income tax deduction has
been available to taxpayers since the War Revenue Act of 1917.262 Today,
taxpayers can deduct charitable contributions of money or property to qualified
organizations.263 Deductions of up to fifty percent of a taxpayer’s adjusted
gross income are available in most circumstances.264
Parents helping their children pay for college can also claim tax benefits
for their contributions.265 Taxpayers can deduct qualified education expenses
paid during the year for a dependent student under the Tuition and Fees
Deduction.266 Qualified education expenses include tuition and fees, room and
board, books, supplies and equipment, and other necessary expenses such as
transportation.267 The Tuition and Fees Deduction can reduce a parent’s
taxable income by up to $4,000.268
While in most scenarios this maximum deduction is far less than the twenty
to fifty percent of income deductible under the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, it is not the only tax benefit available to parents helping their
children pay for college. Parents saving for their children’s education can
contribute to 529 plans.269 Operated by state or educational institutions, 529
plans are designed to offer tax and other incentives to make saving for the
higher education of a child or other designated beneficiary easier.270
Contributions to a 529 plan are not tax deductible, but the earnings and
distributions are exempt from federal, and usually state, taxation when used to
cover qualified education expenses.271 These tax benefits make clear the
government’s support of both charitable giving and investing in higher
education.

262

See War Revenue Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 700, 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
Charitable Contribution Deductions, supra note 258.
264
Id.
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Tax Benefits for Education: Information Center, supra note 258; 529 Plans: Questions and Answers,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/529-plans-questions-and-answers (last visited Nov. 7,
2016).
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Many of the policy arguments made as sponsors encouraged Congress to
adopt RLCDPA are notably similar to ones that can be made in support of a
similar exception for tuition payments.272 For example, Representative George
Gekas urged Congress that the Code should treat voluntary donations
differently than other types of transfers because “[t]he inherent nature of
charitable contributions is that they are made specifically without the intent of
receiving anything in return.”273 The same can be said about tuition payments
made by parents to secure the benefit of an education for their child. While the
contribution might make them feel good and might earn them appreciation
from the beneficiary, just as a charitable donation would, the benefits of their
expenditure fall to someone else and are intended to from the outset.
Representative Gekas also highlighted the nature of the organizations that
receive charitable donations.274 “Religious and charitable organizations,” he
said, “provide valuable services to society and serve the common good.”275
Universities, both public and private, also make important contributions to
society. In addition to providing higher education, universities contribute
greatly to research in science, engineering, and other fields.276 They also
sponsor programs designed to assist military veterans in their transition back to
civilian life and engage students in community partnerships to better their
communities in the areas of arts, education, health, housing, and more.277
Universities are often an important cornerstone in the communities they call
home. The similarities between contributions to charitable organizations and
payments to institutions of higher education support extending similar
protections to these two types of transfers.
2. Proposed Amendments to Protect Tuition Payments
Legislation similar to RLCDPA should be introduced to protect tuition
payments from a trustee’s clawback power. The RLCDPA protects payments
to charitable organizations in two ways: (1) by protecting transfers up to fifteen
percent of a debtor’s income, and (2) by protecting transfers over the fifteen
272

See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. 3999, 4000 (1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
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Highest Research & Development Funding, BEST COLLEGES, http://www.bestcolleges.com/features/
colleges-with-highest-research-and-development-expenditures/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
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See, e.g., Community Partnerships, BROWN U., https://www.brown.edu/academics/college/specialprograms/public-service/community-partnerships (last visited Mar. 3, 2017); Our Programs & Services,
SYRACUSE U. INST. FOR VETERANS AND MIL. FAM., https://ivmf.syracuse.edu/our-programs/ (last visited Mar.
3, 2017).
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percent limit where they are “consistent with the practices of the debtor in
making charitable contributions.”278
First, RLCDPA protects transfers up to fifteen percent of the debtor’s gross
income with the intention of “shift[ing] the burden of proof and limit[ing]
litigation to where there is evidence of change in pattern large enough to
establish fraudulent intent.”279 A similar “safe harbor” should apply to
contributions to education and would effectively reduce the amount of
litigation around the subject.
Fifteen percent of income is a reasonable limitation on educational
expenditures by parents. On average, education spending by low-, middle-, and
high-income parents in 2014 was below this threshold.280 In 2014, middleincome parents with an income between $35,000 and $100,000, contributed
$4,877 on average towards college for their children.281 This equates to less
than fourteen percent of income for any amount of income in that range.282 In
the same year, high-income parents with an income of $100,000 or more
contributed $13,540 on average to their children’s education.283 This number
equates to thirteen and a half percent or less of their income.284 Low-income
parents, with incomes of $35,000 or less, spent an average of $3,826 on their
children’s higher education in 2014.285 This amount falls under eleven percent
of income at an income of $35,000 and only crosses the fifteen percent
threshold where a parent’s income falls below $25,507.286 It is unlikely that
parents with an income of $25,507 or less are spending the $3,826 average on
education because their Expected Family Contribution (EFC), if any, is
minimal.287 In fact, dependent students automatically qualify for an EFC of
zero if their parents’ income is $25,000 or less.288
Creating an exception for educational expenditures that equal fifteen
percent or less of debtor income would mean that spending in line with average
parental contributions to education would not be subject to scrutiny under
278

Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 3.
144 CONG. REC. 3999, 4000 (1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas). See generally Religious Liberty and
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281
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§ 548.289 In turn, this would greatly decrease the number of disputes arising
over the issue and stop the growing trend of litigation on the matter.290
Second, RLCDPA protects transfers over the fifteen percent limit when
they are “consistent with the practices of the debtor in making charitable
contributions.”291 Similar language should be drafted for educational
expenditures. If parents spend more than fifteen percent of their income on
tuition and related fees, but can demonstrate a consistent practice of doing so,
such payments should also be protected. Establishing a consistent practice
should involve looking to college expenditures made for those of the debtor’s
children currently and previously in college and could also consider the
balance of college savings accounts when a debtor’s first or only child has not
been in school long enough to establish a pattern. Of course, whether a debtor
can establish such a consistent practice might still be a matter to be litigated,
but the guideline will further advance the policy considerations that favor
protecting educational spending.
Looking to RLCDPA is a helpful starting point in drafting legislation to
create a tuition exception. However, even though it can be used to demonstrate
deficiencies in the proposed PACT Act, RLCDPA is not without its own
issues.292 RLCDPA was enacted only 262 days after its proposal.293
Probably as a result of being passed so hastily, several “drafting glitches”
have been identified in the Act.294 First, it is unclear from the language of
RLCDPA whether the value of an individual contribution or the cumulative
value of all of a debtor’s annual contributions in a year cannot exceed fifteen
percent of the debtor’s gross annual income.295 Second, RLCDPA does not
specify what portion of a transfer is recoverable by the trustee should
contributions exceed fifteen percent of the debtor’s gross annual income.296
Some courts have said the entire transfer becomes recoverable if it surpasses
the fifteen percent threshold, while others have held that only the amount
289
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above fifteen percent can be clawedback.297 These ambiguities make
application of RLCDPA difficult.
In legislation protecting payments to colleges and universities, the fifteen
percent threshold should apply to the total of a debtor’s educational
expenditures in a given year. Otherwise, as argued in interpreting RLCDPA, a
debtor could give all of his assets away in increments of less than fifteen
percent.298 Further, if a transfer exceeds fifteen percent of a debtor’s income
and is determined to be constructively fraudulent, then the entire transfer
should be recoverable. The additional exception, where there is evidence of a
consistent practice of educational spending, would provide added protection
for debtors that spend more than fifteen percent. Despite this, if it is still
decided fraud exists, the entire transfer should be considered fraudulent.
An effective amendment should ensure the term “tuition” or other term
used to describe the type of expenditures protected is defined to encompass all
payments to universities to cover tuition and fees, as well as room and board,
books, supplies and equipment, and other necessary expenses.299 Finally,
successful legislation will include the amendment to § 544, like the one
included in RLCDPA, that the PACT Act is missing.300 An express exception
to the state strong arm provision is necessary to ensure educational
expenditures are also protected from avoidance powers under state law.
CONCLUSION
Given the rising costs of higher education, financial support from parents
has become increasingly important to students. It is important to protect these
contributions from attempts by court appointed bankruptcy trustees to claw
them back. Trustees may argue that these funds should be used to satisfy the
debtor’s own growing debts, but policy arguments support that parents should
be able to help their children pay for college. The impact of parental income on
student financial aid awards, good faith receipt of payments by schools and
their limited options for recourse, as well as a societal expectation that parents
help pay for college, support protection of educational expenditures in
bankruptcy.
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299
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See, e.g., Murray, 234 B.R. at 373; see also Reicher, supra note 293, at 172.
Reicher, supra note 293, at 164.
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Though the PACT Act seeks to create an all-encompassing exception for
tuition payments from trustee avoidance powers, it falls short of a
comprehensive solution. Looking to RLCDPA for guidance, the Code should
be amended to protect payments by parents to colleges and universities where
such payments total less than fifteen percent of a debtor’s gross income in a
given year, or, if exceeding fifteen percent, the debtor can demonstrate a
consistent pattern of such educational spending.
Effective amendments should address the short-comings of the PACT Act
by ensuring that payments are protected from trustee avoidance powers under
both federal and state law by amending § 548 as well as § 544. They should
also make clear that the fifteen percent limitation applies to a debtor’s total
educational expenditures in a year and indicate that the total amount of a
transfer is recoverable where a transfer is found to be fraudulent. Amending
§ 544 and § 548 of the Code in this way to protect payments by parents for the
higher education of their children would serve the public interest while still
protecting creditors from fraud.
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